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Note
STOKELING v. UNITED STATES: BLURRING THE LINE OF
WHAT CONSTITUTES PHYSICAL FORCE UNDER THE
ELEMENTS CLAUSE OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
TAYLOR HALLOWELL ∗
In Stokeling v. United States, 1 the Court addressed whether the elements
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) encompasses Florida’s
robbery offense, which requires an offender to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance. 2 Although the Court in Johnson v. United
States (Johnson I) 3 declined to apply the common law definition of “force”
to interpret whether a battery qualifies as a predicate offense under the elements clause of the ACCA, 4 the Court in Stokeling relied on the common law
definition of force when considering a robbery conviction in the same context. 5 As a result, the Court held that all state robbery statutes requiring a
defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance categorically qualify as “violent felon[ies]” under the ACCA’s elements clause—no
matter how minimal that force is. 6 The Court incorrectly decided the case,
because the minimal amount of force that can satisfy Florida robbery does
not fit the definition of “physical force” set forth by the Court in Johnson I. 7
The Court also failed to align its holding with the underlying purpose of the
ACCA 8 and misconstrued the statutory history of the ACCA. 9 Lastly, the
Court erroneously decided the case on broad grounds that overlooked idiosyncrasies of Florida robbery, such as minimal force being sufficient and
merely requiring offenders to carry a firearm for armed robbery. 10 The
© 2020 Taylor Hallowell.
∗

J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
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1. 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019).
2. Id. at 548.
3. 559 U.S. 133 (2010).
4. Id. at 139–40.
5. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 551–52.
6. Id. at 555.
7. See infra Section IV.A.
8. See infra Section IV.B.
9. See infra Section IV.C.
10. See infra Section IV.D.
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Stokeling decision is at odds with how the Fourth Circuit has historically
treated robbery. 11 Maryland robbery, which, like Florida robbery, can be satisfied by minimal force, will now most likely join Florida robbery as a crime
of violence under the elements clause of the ACCA. 12
I. THE CASE
Petitioner, Denard Stokeling, was an employee at Tongue & Cheek, a
restaurant in Miami Beach, Florida. 13 On July 27, 2015, police identified
Stokeling as a suspect of a burglary that occurred at the restaurant early that
morning. 14 A criminal background check revealed that Stokeling had previous convictions of home invasion, kidnapping, and robbery. 15 When the Miami Beach Police confronted Stokeling, Stokeling confessed to having a gun
in his backpack. 16 Police then opened his backpack to discover a nine-millimeter semiautomatic firearm, a magazine, and twelve rounds of ammunition. 17 Stokeling pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing a firearm and
ammunition as a convicted felon. 18 The probation office recommended sentencing Stokeling as an armed career criminal under the “elements clause” of
the ACCA, which requires an individual who violates Title 18, section 922(g)
of the United States Code and has three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony” to be sentenced to at least fifteen years in prison. 19 Stokeling
claimed that his 1997 Florida robbery conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under the elements clause “because Florida robbery does not
have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force.’” 20
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that Stokeling’s robbery conviction did not qualify as a “violent felony,”

11. See infra Section IV.E.
12. See infra Section IV.E.
13. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 549 (2019).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has
been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm or ammunition.”).
19. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549; see Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)
(defining “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force”).
20. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)); see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 812.13(1) (West 2016) (defining “robbery” as “the taking of money or other property . . . from the
person or custody of another, . . . when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence,
assault, or putting in fear”).
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though the court reached this conclusion by applying the incorrect test.21 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Florida robbery categorically qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements clause. 22 The court reasoned “[t]he force element of Florida robbery
satisfies the elements clause of the [ACCA]” 23 because Florida robbery requires “resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the
offender.” 24 In his concurring opinion, Judge Martin argued the precedent
the majority applied was wrongly decided. 25 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide “whether the ‘force’ required to commit
robbery under Florida law qualifies as ‘physical force’ for purposes of the
[ACCA’s] elements clause.” 26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before 1984, convicted felons prosecuted for possessing a firearm under
Title 18, section 922(g) of the United States Code were punished with up to
ten years of imprisonment. 27 Then, in 1984, Congress passed the ACCA. 28
The ACCA provides sentencing enhancements for individuals who violate
section 922(g) and have three previous convictions for a “violent felony.” 29
Thereafter, when an individual is prosecuted for possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon, an important determination is whether they have three or
more “violent felony” convictions. 30 Section II.A discusses the ACCA as it
was originally enacted in 1984. 31 Section II.B describes the amendments that

21. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549. The Supreme Court has held that courts must apply the “categorical approach” when determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under
the ACCA. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990). Instead of following the categorical approach by looking only to the statutory definition of Florida robbery, the district court
incorrectly based its decision on the particular facts underlying Stokeling’s conviction. Stokeling,
139 S. Ct. at 549. The court ruled that Stokeling’s attempt at removing the victim’s necklaces as
she held onto them did not justify an enhanced prison sentence. Id.
22. United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Florida robbery is
categorically a crime of violence under the elements of even the least culpable of these acts criminalized by Florida Statutes § 812.13(1).” (quoting United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 941 (11th
Cir. 2016) and citing United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011))), aff’d, 139
S. Ct. 544 (2019).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 872 (quoting Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)).
25. Id. at 876 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Fritts was wrong to suggest that all unarmed robbery
convictions under Fla. Stat. § 812.13 are violent felonies as defined by ACCA’s elements clause
because use of ‘any degree of force’ could support a § 812.13 conviction from 1976 to 1997.”).
26. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 550.
27. Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015).
28. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1
(1984) (explaining the purpose of the ACCA).
29. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 549.
30. Id.
31. See infra Section II.A.
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Congress made to the ACCA in 1986. 32 Section II.C surveys the key treatment of the ACCA by the Supreme Court. 33 Section II.D explores the relationship between Florida robbery and the elements clause of the ACCA.34
Section II.E examines the treatment of Florida robbery in the federal circuits. 35 Lastly, Section II.F compares Florida robbery with Maryland robbery. 36
A. The Original Enactment of the ACCA
In 1984, Congress passed the ACCA in an effort to “curb armed, habitual (career) criminals.” 37 Some individuals are more likely than others to
intentionally cause harm with a firearm. The ACCA is concerned with preventing the danger created when those individuals possess a gun. 38 The
ACCA originally prescribed a minimum of fifteen years in jail for individuals
who possessed a firearm following three prior convictions “for robbery or
burglary.” 39 The House Committee chose to originally target only robbery
and burglary because it viewed those crimes as “the most damaging crimes
to society.” 40 When Senator Arlen Specter introduced the bill, he noted that
“[r]obberies and burglaries occur with far greater frequency than other violent felonies, affect many more people, and cause the greatest losses.” 41 Senator Spector also highlighted that “[a] high percentage of robberies and burglaries are committed by a limited number of repeat offenders.”42 It is
irrefutable that at this point in time, a generic version of robbery qualified as
a predicate offense under the ACCA. 43

32. See infra Section II.B.
33. See infra Section II.C.
34. See infra Section II.D.
35. See infra Section II.E.
36. See infra Section II.F.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984).
38. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008) (holding that a felony conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” because it does not “show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and
pull the trigger”).
39. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 554, 550 (2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)
(Supp. II 1982)); H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6 (1986) (describing changes made to the original language of the ACCA). Robbery was defined as “any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year and consisting of the taking of the property of another from the person or presence of another by force or violence, or by threatening or placing another person in fear that any
person will imminently be subjected to bodily harm.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 7 (highlighting the
1984 definition of robbery that was proposed to be omitted from the ACCA in 1986).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (1986).
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B. The 1986 Amendment to the ACCA
In 1986, Congress amended the ACCA, removing any mention of “robbery” and substituting the language that is still applicable today. 44 The overarching purpose of the 1986 amendment was “to increase the participation of
the Federal law enforcement system in efforts to curb armed, habitual drug
traffickers and violent criminals.” 45 In other words, Congress sought to improve the armed career criminal concept by expanding the number of predicate offenses. 46
In order to qualify as a violent felony, a crime must first be “punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 47 The crime must then
satisfy at least one of the three clauses created in the 1986 amendment—the
elements clause, 48 the enumerated clause, 49 or the residual clause 50—which
describe different qualifications of a violent felony. 51 Under the elements
clause, 52 a qualifying crime must have “as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 53 The enumerated clause lists generic crimes that Congress intended to be violent felonies. 54 These include: burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the
use of explosives. 55 Importantly, the 1986 amendment removed the explicit
reference to “robbery” found in the original statute, while preserving “burglary” in the enumerated clause. 56 The residual clause provided that a felony
that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another” should be treated as a “violent felony.” 57 For
44. Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402(a), 100 Stat. 3207
(“Section 924(e)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out ‘for robbery or burglary, or both,’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or
both.’”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 1 (reporting Congress’s reasoning for amending the
ACCA).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 1.
46. Id. at 3–4.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
48. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”).
49. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives”).
50. Id. (“or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another”).
51. Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402(b), 100 Stat. 3207;
see Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 556 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Clause (i)
is often called the ‘elements clause’ . . . . The first part of clause (ii) is often called the ‘enumerated
clause,’ . . . . The final part of clause (ii) [is] often called the ‘residual clause,’ . . . .”).
52. The elements clause is also sometimes referred to as “the force clause.” See United States
v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2016).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
54. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 556 (2019) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
56. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (1986); see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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decades, these three clauses encompassed the three ways by which a prior
conviction could qualify as a violent felony. 58 Courts often interpreted the
residual clause broadly to include a large range of offenses 59 until 2015 when
the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States (Johnson II) 60 struck the residual clause down for being unconstitutionally vague. 61
C. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Elements Clause of the
ACCA
The Supreme Court has held that sentencing courts must apply the “categorical approach” to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. 62 Instead of looking to the particular underlying facts, courts using the categorical approach look “only to the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” 63 Courts apply
this approach when interpreting both the elements clause and the enumerated
clause. 64 A fact-finding process for every defendant would be impracticable
and unfair, especially when defendants immediately pleaded guilty to prior
offenses. 65 While the categorical approach has been challenged in several
recent Supreme Court dissents, 66 it is still good law. 67
In the context of the elements clause, the categorical approach requires
courts to assess whether the least culpable conduct covered by the statute for
the prior conviction “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another.” 68 According to Johnson
I, physical force in the context of the ACCA means “violent force—that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” 69

58. See Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (holding “that
imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution’s guarantee
of due process”).
59. Id. at 2556–57.
60. Id. at 2563.
61. Id.
62. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990).
63. Id. at 602.
64. Id. at 600–01.
65. Id. at 601–02.
66. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1252 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court should abandon the categorical approach); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2243, 2269–70 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that if “it is perfectly clear” from the record
that a crime occurred, then the conviction should be counted); Descamps v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 2276, 2295 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When it is clear that a defendant necessarily admitted
or the jury necessarily found that the defendant committed the elements of generic burglary, the
conviction should qualify.”).
67. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 549 (2019).
68. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012); Johnson v. United States
(Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010).
69. Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140.
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In Johnson I, the Supreme Court considered whether Florida battery categorically qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause.70 The
Court explicitly rejected the common law definition of “force” in the context
of battery, which required only minimal contact. 71 The Court recognized the
general rule that common law terms, such as battery, should be interpreted
with their common law meaning 72 as long as the common law definition
makes sense in context. 73 However, when common law definitions do not
fit, “context determines meaning.” 74 The Court ultimately ruled that, in the
context of a “violent felony,” the common law definition of battery is a “comical misfit.” 75 At common law, battery could be “satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching.” 76 The slightest touch does not rise to the level of
force required for a crime of violence. 77 Therefore, “force” under the elements clause should be understood as violent force, rather than battery’s common law definition of force. 78 Battery is not a violent felony under the
ACCA. 79
While “physical force” means “violent force” in the context of violent
felonies, 80 the Supreme Court has held that “physical force” can take on its
common law definition in other statutory provisions, like domestic violence. 81 In United States v. Castleman, 82 Castleman pleaded guilty to injuring “the mother of his child,” in violation of the Tennessee statute. 83 Castleman argued that his conviction should not be interpreted as a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” because the statute did not meet
the requisite physical force required by the ACCA. 84 The Court rejected Castleman’s argument, distinguishing the ACCA from domestic violence statutes and holding that the degree of force that satisfies common law battery
qualifies as physical force in the context of domestic violence.85 As a result,

70. Id. at 138.
71. Id. at 139–40 (“The common law held [battery’s] element of ‘force’ to be satisfied by even
the slightest offensive touching.”).
72. Id. at 139 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957)).
73. Id. (citing Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 145.
76. Id. at 139–40.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 145.
80. Id. at 139–49.
81. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162–63 (2014) (holding that “force” takes on its
common law meaning of “offensive touching” in the context of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence”).
82. 572 U.S. 157 (2014).
83. Id. at 161 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b) (Supp. 2002). App. 27).
84. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2012)).
85. Id. at 167–68.
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Castleman’s conviction qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 86
The Court reasoned that Congress likely “meant to incorporate the misdemeanor-specific meaning of ‘force’ in defining a ‘misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence.’” 87 The Court distinguished domestic violence from a
violent felony by noting that domestic violence is “a term of art encompassing acts that one might not characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic context.” 88 The Court in Castleman further supported its conclusion by stating
that “a contrary reading would have rendered [section] 922(g)(9) inoperative
in many States at the time of its enactment.” 89 If the Court had not interpreted
offensive touch to constitute physical force under section 922(g)(9), the statute would not have been applicable in California and at least nine other
states. 90 States with domestic abuse statutes that prohibit only the causation
of bodily injury would remain unaffected. 91 However, some states prohibit
both offensive bodily contact and the causation of bodily injury. 92 Section
922(g)(9) would become inoperative in these states if offensive touching did
not satisfy the statute’s physical force requirement. 93
The Court took a similar approach in Voisine v. United States, 94 denying
an interpretation of section 922(g)(9) that would render it inoperative in
thirty-five jurisdictions. 95 In Voisine, Voisine pleaded guilty to violating
Maine’s domestic abuse statute, which prohibits causing offensive bodily
contact or bodily injury with the mental state of purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. 96 Voisine argued that he should not be subject to section
922(g)(9)’s prohibition of firearms for people convicted of domestic violence, since Maine’s statute can be satisfied by recklessness.97 The Court
rejected his argument, holding that reckless domestic assault qualifies as a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in part because so many state
laws include recklessness. 98 Two thirds of states punish domestic assault the

86. Id.
87. Id. at 164.
88. Id. at 165 (defining acts of domestic violence to include “[h]itting, slapping, shoving, grabbing, pinching, biting, [and] hair pulling” (alterations in original) (quoting DOJ, OFFICE ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm)).
89. Id. at 167.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016).
95. Id. at 2280.
96. Id. at 2277.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2280
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same regardless of whether it is committed with the mens rea of recklessness,
knowledge, or intent. 99
When determining whether a crime qualifies as a predicate offense for
the ACCA, the Supreme Court also considers whether offenders of the crime
would be more dangerous with a gun. 100 In Begay v. United States, 101 the
Court held that driving under the influence is not a violent felony under the
ACCA because individuals who drive under the influence are not necessarily
more likely to commit intentionally violent crimes. 102 Driving under the influence—despite being objectively dangerous—does not make an individual
more dangerous with a gun. 103
D. The Requirements of Florida Robbery
When determining if a state crime qualifies as a “violent felony” under
the ACCA, “federal courts look to, and are constrained by, state courts’ interpretations of state law.” 104 Florida law defines robbery as “the taking of
money or other property . . . from the person or custody of another, . . . when
in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” 105 In Robinson v. State, 106 the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the “use of force” to mean “force sufficient to overcome a victim’s
resistance.” 107 However, “[t]he degree of force used is immaterial,” and can
be minimal. 108 Federal courts are constrained by the Florida Supreme Court’s
interpretation that the elements of robbery can be satisfied where an offender
uses only minimal force. 109

99. Id. at 2278.
100. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008).
101. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
102. Id. at 147–48. The Begay Court considered whether a conviction for driving under the
influence qualified as a violent felony under the now struck-down residual clause. Id. at 140, 144.
103. Id. at 146.
104. United States v. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. 544, 556 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010)).
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.13(1) (West 2016).
106. 692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997).
107. Id. at 887.
108. Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1922); see also McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d
257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (“Any degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”). But see
United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting that Robinson “abrogated” McCloud’s “any degree of force” holding).
109. See Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010).
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E. Federal Circuit Courts’ Treatment of Florida Robbery Convictions
Under the ACCA
Federal circuit courts have disagreed about whether Florida robbery
qualifies as a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the ACCA. 110
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “Florida robbery is ‘undeniably . . . a violent felony’” under the elements clause of the ACCA both before Robinson 111
and after. 112 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has been critical of the
Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of Florida robbery as a “violent felony,” suggesting that the Eleventh Circuit has focused too much on “the use of force
sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance,” while overlooking that the
force can be minimal. 113 In United States v. Geozos, 114 the Ninth Circuit held
that robbery under Florida law is not a “violent felony” because the statute
“proscribes the taking of property even when the force used to take that property is minimal.” 115 The court reasoned that the Florida robbery statute therefore does not require the force used to be violent. 116 The Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits are the only Circuit Courts to publish decisions directly addressing
whether Florida robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA and they are
split on their interpretation. 117
F. The Relationship Between Florida Robbery and Maryland Robbery
Florida robbery and Maryland robbery share two significant similarities:
1) both require force sufficient to overcome resistance of the victim, 118 and

110. Compare United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing United
States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006)) (holding that Florida robbery is categorically
a violent felony), with United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that
Florida robbery is not categorically a violent felony).
111. Lee, 886 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Dowd, 451 F.3d at 1255).
112. Id. (citing United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011)).
113. Geozos, 870 F.3d at 901 (“[W]e think that the Eleventh Circuit, in focusing on the fact that
Florida robbery requires a use of force sufficient to overcome the resistance of the victim, has overlooked the fact that, if the resistance itself is minimal, then the force used to overcome that resistance
is not necessarily violent force.”).
114. 870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017).
115. Id. at 901.
116. Id.
117. While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that Florida robbery qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA, United States v. Orr, 685 F. App’x
263, 267 (4th Cir. 2017), the opinion is unpublished and has since been criticized by the Fourth
Circuit itself. United States v. Dinkins, 928 F.3d 349, 356 n.5 (4th Cir. 2019) (“To the extent that
our unpublished decision in [Orr] suggests that there is a distinction between North Carolina common law robbery and Florida robbery, that decision did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Stokeling. Further, as an unpublished decision, Orr is not binding precedent.”).
118. See Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 887 (Fla. 1997); Cooper v. State, 9 Md. App. 478,
480, 265 A.2d 569, 571 (1970).
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2) both may be satisfied by minimal force. 119 Under Maryland common law,
robbery is “the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property
of another from his person by the use of violence or by putting in fear.” 120 In
Maryland, robbery maintains its common law definition 121 with two exceptions: 1) “robbery includes obtaining the service of another by force or threat
of force;” 122 and 2) “robbery requires proof of intent to withhold property of
another.” 123
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland issued two decisions in 1970
holding that the “fear” element of robbery may be satisfied by “fear . . . of
injury to the person or to property, as for example, a threat to burn down a
house.” 124 While these rulings have never been overturned, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has considered the discussion of the
“fear” element to be mere dicta, since neither case was decided based on fear
of injury to property. 125
The degree of force required to constitute “violence” for Maryland robbery is functionally equivalent to the degree of force necessary for Florida
robbery. 126 In Maryland—like in Florida—robbery requires force sufficient
to overcome resistance of the victim. 127 However—as in Florida—the force
used may be minimal. 128 The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that “the
degree of force used . . . [is] immaterial ‘so long as it is sufficient to compel
the victim to part with his property.’” 129 Similarly, the Court of Appeals has
stated that “[i]f . . . the use of force enables the accused to retain possession
of the property in the face of immediate resistance from the victim, then the
taking is properly considered a robbery.” 130 On the other hand, sudden
119. See McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976); Cooper, 9 Md. App. at 480, 265
A.2d at 571.
120. Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792, 490 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1985).
121. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-401(e) (2012).
122. Id. § 3-401(e)(1).
123. Id. § 3-401(e)(2).
124. Giles v. State, 8 Md. App. 721, 723, 262 A.2d 806, 807 (1970) (emphasis added); Douglas
v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 654, 267 A.2d 291, 295 (1970) (“That the fear be of great bodily harm is
not a requisite. Nor need the fear be of bodily injury at all.” (emphasis added)).
125. United States v. Bell, 901 F.3d 455, 471 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he dicta on which Bell relies
have apparently never been repeated by any Maryland court in the nearly five decades since Douglas
and Giles were decided.”).
126. See McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (holding that “[a]ny degree of force
suffices to convert larceny into a robbery” in Florida); Cooper v. State, 9 Md. App. 478, 480, 265
A.2d 569, 571 (1970) (holding that, for Maryland robbery, “the degree of force used is immaterial . . . .”).
127. Cooper, 9 Md. App. at 480, 265 A.2d at 571 (“[S]ufficient force must be used to overcome
resistance and the mere force that is required to take possession, when there is no resistance, is not
enough.”).
128. Id.
129. West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 205, 539 A.2d 231, 234 (1988) (quoting Cooper, 9 Md. App.
at 480, 265 A.2d at 569).
130. Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 188, 699 A.2d 1170, 1185 (Md. 1997).
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snatching does not amount to robbery in Maryland. 131 Therefore, Maryland
robbery and Florida robbery require equivalent degrees of force.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In 2019 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to directly address
“whether the ‘force’ required to commit robbery under Florida law qualifies
as ‘physical force’ for purposes of the elements clause” in Stokeling v. United
States. 132 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas determined that the level
of “force” necessary for Florida robbery—force sufficient to overcome the
resistance of the victim—equates to the use of “physical force” under the
elements clause of the ACCA. 133 Therefore, Florida robbery, along with all
other state robbery statutes requiring the offender to overcome the victim’s
resistance, categorically qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. 134
The Court first drew parallels between the common law definition of
robbery, the Florida robbery statute, and the language of the ACCA. 135 Specifically, the Court asserted that the definition of robbery in the original 1984
ACCA was “a clear reference” to common law robbery because both required
“force or violence.” 136 The Court then reasoned that since robbery had its
common law meaning in the 1984 ACCA, then the mention of “force” in the
elements clause of the amended ACCA must retain the common law definition of “force.” 137 Subsequently, the Court stated that Florida robbery must
qualify under the elements clause because Florida robbery requires the same
degree of “force” as what was necessary to commit robbery at common
law. 138
The Court then discussed how its understanding of “physical force”
comports with precedent. 139 In Johnson I, the Court held that “‘physical
force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or
injury.” 140 The Court reasoned that, though battery did not amount to “physical force,” robbery is distinguishable. 141 The Court argued that “the force

131. See West, 312 Md. at 206, 539 A.2d at 235 (“As in Cooper, the victim here was never
placed in fear; she did not resist; she was not injured.”).
132. 139 S. Ct. 544, 550 (2019).
133. Id. at 555.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 550–52.
136. Id. at 551.
137. Id. at 551–52 (“By replacing robbery as an enumerated offense with a clause that has
‘force’ as its touchstone, Congress made clear that ‘force’ retained the same common-law definition
that undergirded the original definition of robbery adopted a mere two years earlier.”).
138. Id. at 555.
139. Id. at 552–53.
140. Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
141. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 553.
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necessary to overcome a victim’s physical resistance is inherently ‘violent,’”
while the “slightest offensive touching” is not.142
Finally, the Court described the consequences of ruling for Stokeling. 143
The Court highlighted that “many States’ robbery statutes would not qualify
as ACCA predicates under Stokeling’s reading.” 144 The Court also rejected
Stokeling’s proposed definition for “physical force”—force “reasonably expected to cause pain or injury” 145—because it would be difficult for lower
courts to assess whether a crime is categorically expected to cause bodily
injury. 146
In her dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsberg, and
Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for “distort[ing]
Johnson.” 147 Contrary to the majority’s holding, Justice Sotomayor found
the minimal force that can satisfy Florida robbery 148 does not rise to the level
of “violent force” required by Johnson I. 149 Justice Sotomayor also argued
that the Florida robbery statute is so broad that not all offenders “present the
increased risk of gun violence” that the ACCA seeks to target.150 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor suggested the effects of ruling for Stokeling were not
as extreme as the majority insinuated, since neither party offered evidence of
how many state robbery statutes are satisfied by minimal force. 151
IV. ANALYSIS
In Stokeling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Florida robbery qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA because the term “physical force” in the elements clause includes the amount of force necessary to
overcome a victim’s resistance.152 The Court’s holding was ultimately incorrect because it is inconsistent with the Court’s previous holding in Johnson I. 153 In addition, the Court failed to align its holding with the underlying

142. Id.
143. Id. at 554.
144. Id. at 552.
145. Id. at 554.
146. Id. (“We decline to impose yet another indeterminable line-drawing exercise on the lower
courts.”).
147. Id. at 555 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
148. Montsdoca v. State, 93 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1922) (holding that “[t]he degree of force used
is immaterial”); see also McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (“Any degree of force
suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”). But see United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870,
871 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting that Robinson “abrogated” McCloud’s
“any degree of force” holding).
149. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also supra Section II.C.
150. Id. at 559 (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008)).
151. Id. at 563–64.
152. Id. at 555.
153. See infra Section IV.A.
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purpose of the ACCA, 154 and misconstrued the statutory history of the
ACCA. 155 Furthermore, the Court erroneously decided the case on broad
grounds that overlooked idiosyncrasies of Florida robbery. 156 The decision is
at odds with how the Fourth Circuit has treated robbery statutes satisfied by
minimal force, and will most likely transform Maryland robbery into being a
crime of violence under the elements clause. 157
A. The Court’s Holding Is Incorrect Because It Is Inconsistent with
Johnson I
The Court improperly reasoned that Johnson I is distinguishable from
Stokeling. 158 In Johnson I, the Supreme Court held that “in the context of a
statutory definition of ‘violent felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 159 Rather than looking at the word “capable” in context, the
majority turned to dictionary definitions, insisting that the word “does not
require any particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used
will cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality.” 160 The Johnson I Court,
however, could not have meant “capable” as “potentiality,” because the battery statute that the Johnson I Court rejected as being a “violent felony” covered actions with the potentiality of causing injury. 161 In her dissent, Justice
Sotomayor noted, “As any first-year torts student (or person with a shoulder
injury) quickly learns, even a tap on the shoulder is ‘capable of causing physical pain or injury’ in certain cases.” 162 The slightest touch has the potential
of causing pain. 163
Florida robbery does not meet the Johnson I Court’s definition of “physical force” because Florida robbery—similar to battery—is satisfied by minimal force. 164 Most notably, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “[a]ny
degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.” 165 For example,
a thief who “peel[s] [his victim’s] fingers back in order to get the money” is
154. See infra Section IV.B.
155. See infra Section IV.C.
156. See infra Section IV.D.
157. See infra Section IV.E.
158. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
159. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); see also Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d
666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the word “force” in the “legal community” must mean force
that is “violent in nature—the sort that is intended to cause bodily injury, or at a minimum likely to
do so”).
160. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 554.
161. Id. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. McCloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976); see also Montsdoca v. State, 93 So.
157, 159 (Fla. 1922) (“The degree of force used is immaterial.”).
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a robber in Florida, even though the victim does not “put up greater resistance.” 166 The Stokeling majority focused on the fact that Florida robbery
requires force sufficient to overcome the resistance of a victim, 167 while overlooking that the force can be minimal. 168 Because Florida robbery can be
conducted with minimal force, the least culpable conduct of Florida robbery
is outside the scope of the Johnson I Court’s definition of physical force. 169
The practical result of the Court’s holding is that there are now two definitions of “physical force” within a single statutory provision—one definition for battery and another for robbery. 170 The Court in Johnson I expressly
rejected ascribing the common law definition of “force” to physical force in
the context of battery. 171 By construing “physical force” in the context of
robbery to have the common law definition of “force,” 172 the Court has created two different meanings for a phrase within a single statutory provision. 173 This “is a radical and unsupportable step” leading to “a brave new
world of textual interpretation.” 174 The Court’s reasoning should have been
grounded in the precedent set in Johnson I, which would have led to Florida
robbery not qualifying as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. 175

166. Sanders v. State, 769 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also Robinson v. State,
692 So. 2d 883, 887 n.10 (Fla. 1997) (explaining that a theft in Florida would transform into a
robbery if a victim were to catch a pickpocket’s arm and the pickpocket then pulled free). Compare
Sanders, 769 So. 2d at 507, with Goldsmith v. State, 573 So. 2d 445, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that snatching money without contacting the victim’s hand is not robbery in Florida).
167. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555; Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 887 (Fla. 1997) (interpreting the “use of force” in the context of a purse snatching to mean “force sufficient to overcome a
victim’s resistance”).
168. Montsdoca, 93 So. at 159 (“The degree of force used is immaterial.”); see also McCloud,
335 So. 2d at 258 (“Any degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.”). But see United
States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., concurring) (suggesting that
Robinson’s requirement of force sufficient to overcome resistance of the victim repudiated
McCloud’s “any degree of force” holding).
169. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 560.
171. Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 139–40 (2010).
172. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555.
173. Id. at 560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
174. Id. In contrast, holding “physical force” to have two different definitions within two different statutory provisions is not problematic. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162–63
(2014) (holding that “physical force” takes on its common law meaning of “offensive touching” in
the context of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”).
175. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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B. The Court Failed to Align Its Holding with the Underlying Purpose
of the ACCA
The nature of Florida robbery does not comport with the underlying purpose of the ACCA. 176 In Begay v. United States, 177 the Supreme Court explained the ACCA was designed to target “the special danger created when a
particular type of offender—a violent criminal or drug trafficker—possesses
a gun.” 178 The Begay Court then held that a felony conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol is not a violent felony because it does not
“show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who
might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.” 179 Similarly, the Florida robbery statute is so broad that not all offenders “bear the hallmarks of
being the kind of people who are likely to point a gun and pull the trigger.” 180
An individual can be convicted for robbery in Florida by merely “engaging
in a tug-of-war over the victim’s purse.” 181 This minimal amount of force
does not make an individual more likely to be dangerous with a gun, 182 and
misses the statutory purpose of controlling violent crimes committed by violent career criminals. 183 The Stokeling decision has made the ACCA too
overinclusive. The ACCA can now treat individuals who have only ever used
minimal force as violent career criminals. Three counts of robbery with minimal force should not equate to a minimum of fifteen years in prison. The
ACCA ought to only be applied in cases where the offender is likely to be
violent with a firearm.
C. The Court Misconstrued the Statutory History of the ACCA
The statutory history of the ACCA does not suggest a common law definition of “force” in the context of robbery, as the Stokeling Court proposed. 184 When Congress amended the ACCA in 1986, it removed a reference to robbery while keeping the word burglary. 185 When Congress deletes
a statutory provision while retaining other language, the Court generally has

176. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984) (describing Congress’s intended purpose of the
ACCA).
177. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
178. Id. at 146; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
179. Begay, 553 U.S. at 146.
180. Stokeling, S. Ct. at 559 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
181. Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing McCloud v.
State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258–59 (Fla. 1976)).
182. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 559 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
183. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990).
184. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 562–63 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
185. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (1986) (describing changes made to the original language of
the ACCA).
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“no trouble concluding that” Congress does so with purpose. 186 Congress
most likely had a purpose for deleting robbery because Congress had the
choice to enumerate robbery alongside burglary in the amended ACCA, but
chose not to do so. 187 Moreover, since robbery and burglary were the only
two crimes enumerated in the original ACCA, 188 “it is inconceivable that
Congress simply lost track of robbery.” 189 Perhaps Congress deleted robbery
and added the elements clause both as a way to 1) limit robbery convictions
to those requiring a threshold degree of force, and 2) expand then number of
predicate offenses involving physical force.
The Court argued that Congress’ “stated intent to expand the number of
qualifying offenses” supports the notion of reading “force” to include the
crime of robbery under the elements clause. 190 The Court, however, overlooked the fact that the amended version of the ACCA would encompass
many more predicate crimes even if no robbery statutes were to qualify. 191
The elements clause, the lengthened enumerated clause, and the residual
clause all allowed for many more predicate offenses to qualify under the
amended ACCA. 192 Moreover, even if Congress had wanted robbery to remain a predicate offense, it is possible that Congress could have intended for
it to fall under the now struck-down residual clause. 193 For example, before
the Court struck down the residual clause in Johnson II, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit considered Florida robbery to be a violent felony
under the residual clause. 194

186. Dir. of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U.S. 316, 324 (2001) (stating that if Congress
had deleted a sentence limiting a tax exemption while retaining the sentence granting the exemption,
then it would have been clear that Congress intended the exemption to apply to cooperatives without
limitation).
187. See id. (suggesting that when Congress deletes some statutory language while keeping surrounding language, it has motivation to do so).
188. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6–7 (describing changes made to the original language of the
ACCA).
189. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 561–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 551 (majority opinion).
191. Id. at 562 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id.; Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (holding “that
imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution’s guarantee
of due process”); see also United States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that Florida’s “robbery by sudden snatching” presented “‘a serious risk of physical injury to another’
under the residual clause”). Crimes previously housed under the residual clause now must satisfy
the elements clause to be considered violent felonies. See Conrad Kahn & Danli Song, A Touchy
Subject: The Eleventh Circuit’s Tug-of-War over What Constitutes Violent “Physical Force,” 72
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1130, 1135 (2018) (“Without the residual clause, the validity of thousands of
ACCA enhancements now depends on whether predicate convictions qualify under the elements
clause . . . .”).
194. Welch, 683 F.3d at 1312.
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D. The Court Erroneously Decided the Case on Broad Grounds That
Overlooked Idiosyncrasies of Florida Robbery
The effects of ruling for Stokeling are not as extreme as the Court suggested. 195 The Court asserted that finding for Stokeling would effectively
exclude the majority of state robbery statutes from qualifying as violent felonies because a majority of states define robbery as requiring force that overcomes the resistance of the victim. 196 This reasoning is flawed. 197 Importantly, neither party offered information on how many states allow
minimal force to satisfy their requirement of overcoming the victim’s resistance. 198 While some states do have robbery laws that may be satisfied by
minimal force, 199 other state laws are more like South Carolina’s, which requires more than minimal force when overcoming a victim’s resistance. 200
Thus, the Court should have framed this case more narrowly, as presenting
only the question of “whether a robbery offense that has as an element the
use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance—even if that resistance is minimal—necessitates the use of ‘physical force’ within the meaning of the ACCA.” 201 Under Johnson I, the answer to that question is a resounding “no.” 202 Even if the Court’s ruling would disallow many robbery
statutes from qualifying as predicate offenses under the ACCA, this alone is
not a compelling reason for the Court’s decision. 203 The number of possible
violent felonies was also decreased when Congress chose not to enumerate
robbery 204 and when the Court struck down the residual clause. 205

195. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 563–64 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 552 (majority opinion).
197. Id. at 563 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 803–04 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that
“North Carolina common law robbery does not categorically match the force clause of the ACCA”
because it requires only “minimal contact”); United States v. Lattanzio, 232 F. Supp. 3d 220, 229
(D. Mass. 2017) (holding that Massachusetts robbery is not a violent felony under the ACCA because Massachusetts robbery can be satisfied by minimal force); United States v. Dunlap, 162 F.
Supp. 3d 1106, 1114–15 (D. Or. 2016) (holding that Oregon robbery does not qualify as a predicate
offense under the ACCA because Oregon robbery “requires only minimal force”).
200. United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 312 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that South Carolina
robbery meets the physical force threshold because “there is no indication that South Carolina robbery by violence can be committed with minimal actual force”); see also United States v. Harris,
844 F.3d 1260, 1267–68 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that Colorado robbery is categorically a crime of
violence under the ACCA because “robbery in Colorado requires a violent taking”).
201. Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 563 n.3 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 555. Minimal force is not necessarily “violent force.” See Johnson v. United States
(Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (defining “physical force” as “violent force—that is, force
capable of causing physical pain or injury”).
203. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 563 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
204. See supra Section II.B; see also supra text accompanying note 169.
205. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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The Court also feared that ruling for Stokeling would exclude many
armed robbery statutes. 206 Admittedly, holding that basic Florida robbery
does not qualify under the ACCA would also exclude Florida armed robbery 207 from qualifying under the ACCA. 208 However, “there is scant reason
to believe” that many other state armed robbery statutes would be affected,
because Florida armed robbery “stems from the idiosyncrasy” of merely requiring offenders to carry a firearm, without necessarily displaying it. 209
The Court’s broad inclusion of all robbery statutes that require offenders
to overcome resistance of the victim will have the effect of enhancing prison
sentences for individuals who have only ever used minimal force.210 Classifying individuals who use only minimal force as violent felons misses the
purpose of the ACCA, which is to “incarcerat[e] dangerous career criminals.” 211
E. Impact of the Stokeling Decision on Maryland Law
Maryland may be among the states affected by the Stokeling decision.
Since the Court in Stokeling held that all state robbery statutes requiring a
defendant to use force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance categorically qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA’s elements clause, 212 Maryland robbery is now most likely a violent felony. The one caveat is that
Giles v. State 213 and Douglas v. State 214—the two decisions stating that Maryland robbery may be satisfied by fear of harm to property—are still good
law. 215 Even though the Maryland Court of Appeals has criticized the rulings
as dicta that have never again been relied upon,216 it is possible that Maryland
could rely on these cases in the future to circumvent the Stokeling decision.
206. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 552 (majority opinion).
207. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.13(2)(a) (West 2016).
208. See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 552 (“Florida requires the same element of ‘force’ for both
armed robbery and basic robbery.”); State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (quoting FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 812.13) (implying that Florida has the same “force” requirement for both basic and
armed robbery).
209. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 564 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Burris, 875 So. 2d at 413.
210. See Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 558 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“While [Florida robbery] can,
of course, be accomplished with more than minimal force, [it] need not be.”). The Court’s holding
will perhaps have the largest effect on Florida. Stephen R. Sady, ACCA Lessons: The Armed Career
Criminal Act—What’s Wrong with “Three Strikes, You’re Out”?, 7 FED. SENT. R. 69, 70 (1994)
(noting that from 1991 to 1994, “Florida’s three Districts had the same number of ACCA convictions as forty-five other districts put together”).
211. Sady, supra note 210, at 69.
212. Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555.
213. 8 Md. App. 721, 723, 261 A.2d 806, 807 (1970).
214. 9 Md. App. 647, 652–53, 267 A.2d 291, 295 (1970).
215. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
216. United States v. Bell, 901 F.3d 455, 471 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he dicta on which Bell relies
have apparently never been repeated by any Maryland court in the nearly five decades since Douglas
and Giles were decided.”).
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The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as a crime that “has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another.” 217 So, if a Maryland court were to rely on the dicta construing
robbery to include threats against property in a precedential opinion, then the
“application of force to property” would be “insufficient to trigger an ACCA
enhancement.” 218 On the other hand, if Maryland were to either overrule or
continue to ignore the Giles and Douglas dicta, then the Stokeling decision
would cause Maryland robbery to be a violent felony for the purposes of the
ACCA enhancement.
Prior to Stokeling, however, Maryland robbery has not generally been
considered a violent felony. 219 While the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has never directly ruled on whether Maryland robbery constitutes a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA, 220 the court’s
treatment of other states’ robbery laws sheds light onto how it would view
Maryland robbery. For example, in United States v. Gardner, 221 the Fourth
Circuit considered whether North Carolina common law robbery qualified as
a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the ACCA. 222 Like Maryland
robbery, “North Carolina common law robbery . . . requires the taking of
property by means of ‘violence’ or ‘fear.’” 223 The Fourth Circuit emphasized
that “even de minimis contact can constitute the ‘violence’ necessary for a
common law robbery conviction under North Carolina law.” 224 The court
then turned to Johnson I, and held that the minimal force that can satisfy
North Carolina robbery does not rise to the level of “violent force” necessary
to qualify as a “violent felony” under the elements clause. 225 Thus, the Fourth

217. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).
218. United States v. Clarke, 171 F. Supp. 3d 449, 455 n.7 (D. Md. 2016).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 272 F. Supp. 3d 127, 143 (D.D.C. 2017).
220. The Fourth Circuit did rule in United States v. Wilson that Maryland robbery is a “crime of
violence” under the elements clause, 951 F.2d 586, 588 (4th Cir. 1991), but this was before the
Supreme Court’s holding in Moncrieffe v. Holder, which requires courts to evaluate the minimum
conduct to which there is a realistic probability that a state would apply the law, 569 U.S. 184, 191
(2013). The Fourth Circuit in Wilson did not look to such minimum conduct. United States v.
Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 803 (4th Cir. 2016).
221. 823 F.3d 793 (4th Cir. 2016).
222. Id. at 801–04.
223. Id. at 801; see also State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (N.C. 1982) (defining North Carolina common law robbery as “the felonious, non-consensual taking of money or personal property
from the person or presence of another by means of violence or fear”).
224. Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803; see also State v. Sawyer, 29 S.E.2d 34, 37 (N.C. 1944) (“Although actual force implies personal violence, the degree of force used is immaterial, so long as it is
sufficient to compel the victim to part with his property . . . .”).
225. Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803–04 (holding that because North Carolina robbery includes acts
involving “even minimal contact” with the victim, “the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a
conviction . . . does not necessarily include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,’ as required by the force clause of the
ACCA” (quoting Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)).

526

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:506

Circuit has treated robbery requiring only minimal force—like Maryland robbery—as not qualifying as a “violent felony” under the elements clause of
the ACCA. The Stokeling decision will therefore affect how robbery is interpreted in the Fourth Circuit, since the Supreme Court’s ruling is in direct
contradiction to past Fourth Circuit precedent.
Courts from other circuits have historically asserted that Maryland robbery is not a crime of violence. For instance, in 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Maryland robbery is not a
violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA because it does “not
require the requisite use of physical force.” 226 The district court has also
stated that Maryland robbery does not qualify as a predicate offense because
the minimal amount of “force required to overcome resistance and support a
conviction for Maryland [r]obbery does not necessarily rise to the level of
violent force capable of causing physical injury.” 227 In addition, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has held that
“Maryland robbery . . . does not qualify as a predicate offense under the
ACCA.” 228 The Stokeling decision, however, will most likely cause Maryland robbery to join Florida robbery as a “violent felony” under the elements
clause of the ACCA. As a result, individuals convicted of three Maryland
robberies who violate section 922(g) could be considered violent career criminals and sentenced to over fifteen years in prison, even if they have only ever
used minimal force.
V. CONCLUSION
In Stokeling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that all state robbery statutes requiring the amount of force necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance categorically qualify as “violent felonies” under the elements
clause of the ACCA. 229 The Court incorrectly decided the case because the
minimal amount of force that can satisfy Florida robbery does not fit the definition of “physical force” set forth by the Court in Johnson I. 230 By qualifying Florida robbery as a “violent felony,” the Court failed to align its holding
with the underlying purpose of the ACCA—to target violent career criminals. 231 The Court also misconstrued the statutory history of the ACCA by
going to great lengths to compare common law definitions, while failing to
give proper weight to the fact that Congress chose to delete “robbery” and
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keep “burglary.” 232 Lastly, the Court erroneously framed the case too
broadly, overlooking the idiosyncrasies of Florida robbery. 233 The Stokeling
decision directly contradicts how the Fourth Circuit has historically ruled on
robbery. 234 Maryland robbery, which, like Florida robbery, can be satisfied
by minimal force, will now most likely join Florida robbery as a crime of
violence under the elements clause of the ACCA. 235
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